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Corruption	  in	  Russia	  is	  a	  Serious	  Problem	  
The	  problems	  affecting	  Russia	  because	  of	  corruption	  are	  serious	  and	  pressing.	  Police	  
officers,	  judges,	  government	  officials,	  and	  many	  others	  are	  involved	  in	  taking	  bribes	  for	  services	  
or	  benefits	  they	  provide.	  These	  actions	  are	  contrary	  to	  the	  laws	  they	  are	  to	  follow,	  and	  they	  are	  
preventing	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  from	  operating	  properly	  in	  Russia.	  In	  order	  to	  resolve	  this	  issue	  
Russia	  needs	  to	  understand	  how	  corruption	  works	  against	  national	  progress,	  how	  society	  
perceives	  the	  efforts	  of	  Russian	  presidents	  in	  the	  battle	  against	  corruption,	  and	  how	  those	  
perceptions	  can	  be	  utilized	  to	  help	  improve	  the	  situation.	  
According	  to	  Lanny	  A.	  Breuer,	  who	  was	  the	  Assistant	  Attorney	  General	  of	  the	  United	  
States,	  “when	  corruption	  takes	  hold	  in	  any	  nation,	  its	  political	  institutions	  tend	  to	  lose	  
legitimacy,	  threatening	  democratic	  stability	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law.”1	  Mr.	  Breuer	  made	  this	  
comment	  during	  a	  speech	  to	  the	  third	  Russia	  and	  Commonwealth	  of	  Independent	  States	  
Summit	  on	  Anti-­‐Corruption.	  For	  Russia,	  the	  corruption	  Mr.	  Breuer	  talked	  about	  leads	  to	  further	  
problems	  in	  the	  performance	  of	  its	  economy	  which	  prevents	  the	  progress	  of	  its	  society.	  
A	  report	  by	  Harvard’s	  Nieman	  Reports	  in	  spring	  2011	  states	  that,	  “President	  Dmitry	  
Medvedev’s	  administration	  says	  that	  in	  just	  one	  year	  corrupt	  government	  contracts	  drained	  the	  
Russian	  economy	  of	  a	  trillion	  rubles	  ($35	  billion).”2	  With	  this	  staggering	  amount	  of	  economic	  
loss,	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  economic	  growth	  in	  Russia	  is	  hampered	  greatly	  by	  the	  effects	  of	  
corruption.	  Further	  observation	  from	  Antonio	  Spilimbergo,	  the	  mission	  chief	  for	  the	  
                                                
1	  Breuer,	  Lanny	  A.	  “Assistant	  Attorney	  General	  Lanny	  A.	  Breuer	  of	  the	  Criminal	  Division	  Speaks	  at	  the	  3rd	  Russia	  
and	  Commonwealth	  of	  Independent	  States	  Summit	  on	  Anti-­‐Corruption.”	  Justice	  News.	  The	  United	  States	  
Department	  of	  Justice.	  16	  March	  2011.	  Web.	  22	  February	  2013.	  	  
2	  “Russia:	  Corruption	  Isn’t	  Only	  a	  Threat	  to	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  System	  -­‐	  It	  Is	  the	  System.”	  Nieman	  Reports.	  The	  Nieman	  Foundation	  






International	  Monetary	  Fund	  in	  Russia,	  stated	  that	  “in	  order	  to	  diversify	  the	  economy	  and	  build	  
growth	  potential	  in	  other	  sectors,	  the	  country	  has	  to	  attract	  both	  domestic	  and	  international	  
investment.	  But	  this	  cannot	  happen	  if	  there	  is	  a	  problem	  with	  corruption	  and	  transparency.”3	  
When	  international	  businesses	  are	  unable	  to	  trust	  the	  Russian	  government	  and	  business	  
owners	  they	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  take	  their	  business	  to	  Russia.	  Russia	  will	  need	  to	  overcome	  
corruption	  in	  order	  to	  help	  grow	  investment	  and	  its	  economy.	  
Russians	  need	  to	  understand	  how	  corruption	  affects	  them,	  and	  they	  need	  to	  understand	  
the	  magnitude	  of	  this	  problem.	  There	  is	  a	  general	  perception	  that	  corruption	  is	  acceptable	  
throughout	  Russia.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  corruption	  will	  persist	  because	  Russian’s	  are	  not	  fully	  aware	  
of	  the	  consequences	  resulting	  from	  this	  problem.	  An	  informed	  populace	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  deal	  
with	  their	  problems	  and	  not	  contribute	  to	  furthering	  the	  problem.	  	  
Several	  academics,	  Man	  (2009)4	  &	  Orttung	  (2006),5	  recommend	  that	  Russia	  needs	  to	  
involve	  their	  society	  in	  this	  fight.	  They	  suggest	  it	  can	  be	  done	  by	  providing	  oversight	  through	  
non-­‐governmental	  organizations,	  the	  media,	  and	  its	  citizens.	  	  
The	  following	  section	  will	  go	  into	  depth	  on	  what	  the	  literature	  has	  discussed	  with	  
regards	  to	  involving	  society	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  corruption.	  There,	  I	  will	  also	  discuss	  further	  the	  





                                                
3	  International	  Monetary	  Fund.	  Russia	  Needs	  Deep	  Reforms	  to	  Maximize	  its	  Growth	  Potential.	  IMF	  Survey	  (August	  
3,	  2012).	  Web.	  4	  March	  2013.	  	  
4	  Man,	  Michelle.	  “Political	  Corruption	  in	  Russia:	  An	  Evaluation	  of	  Russia’s	  Anti-­‐Corruption	  Strategies,	  1991-­‐2009.”	  
POLIS	  Journal.	  Vol.	  2	  (Winter	  2009).	  	  







The	  global	  literature	  on	  corruption	  is	  increasing	  because	  of	  organizations	  such	  as	  
Transparency	  International	  and	  the	  World	  Bank.	  They	  are	  improving	  understanding	  about	  the	  
detrimental	  effects	  of	  corruption,	  but	  more	  needs	  to	  be	  done	  in	  Russia.	  Fortunately,	  there	  are	  
some	  academics	  like	  Belousova,	  et	  al	  (2011),6	  Mishler	  &	  Rose	  (2010),7	  and	  others	  who	  seek	  to	  
better	  understand	  corruption	  in	  Russia.	  A	  close	  look	  at	  their	  writings	  will	  provide	  the	  necessary	  
context	  to	  understand	  corruption	  and	  the	  perceptions	  of	  Russian	  society	  with	  regards	  to	  
Presidents	  Vladimir	  Putin	  and	  Dmitry	  Medvedev.	  
Some	  of	  the	  major	  findings	  that	  come	  from	  the	  literature	  are:	  (1)	  Russia’s	  populace	  is	  
somewhat	  accepting	  of	  corruption	  (Kofanova	  &	  Petukhov	  20068);	  (2)	  civil	  society	  in	  Russia	  
needs	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  corruption	  (Man	  2009);	  (3)	  Putin	  has	  failed	  to	  
effectively	  fight	  corruption	  (Demidov	  20059	  and	  Holmes	  200810);	  (4)	  rhetoric	  affects	  the	  fight	  
against	  corruption	  (Orttung	  2006),	  and	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  different	  ways	  to	  
measure	  corruption	  (Mishler	  &	  Rose	  2010).	  
Kofanova	  &	  Petukhov	  (2006)	  argue	  that	  administrative	  measures	  are	  not	  the	  only	  
measures	  needed	  to	  “conquer	  corruption.”11	  Another	  measure	  and	  one	  that	  is	  important	  to	  the	  
research	  done	  in	  this	  study	  is	  Man’s	  (2009)	  recommendation	  about	  the	  need	  to	  involve	  civil	  
                                                
6	  Belousova,	  Veronika,	  et	  al.	  “Causes	  of	  Corruption	  in	  Russia:	  A	  Disaggregated	  Analysis.”	  The	  Bank	  of	  Finland	  
(BOFIT)	  Institute	  for	  Economies	  in	  Transition.	  BOFIT	  Discussion	  Papers	  31	  (2011).	  
7	  Mishler,	  William	  &	  Rose,	  Richard.	  “Experience	  Versus	  Perception	  of	  Corruption:	  Russia	  as	  a	  Test	  Case.”	  Global	  
Crime.	  Vol.	  11,	  No.	  2	  (May	  2010).	  
8	  Kofanova,	  E.N.	  &	  Petukhov.	  “Public	  Opinion	  of	  Corruption	  in	  Russia.”	  Russian	  Social	  Science	  Review.	  Vol.	  47,	  No.	  6	  
(November-­‐December	  2006).	  
9	  Demidov,	  Boris.	  Corruption	  in	  Russia,	  2000–2003:	  The	  Role	  of	  the	  Federal	  Okrugs	  and	  Presidential	  Envoys	  (2005).	  	  	  
10	  Holmes,	  Leslie.	  “Corruption	  and	  Organised	  Crime	  in	  Putin’s	  Russia.”	  Europe-­‐Asia	  Studies.	  Vol.	  60,	  No.	  6	  (August	  
2008).	  






society.	  Kofanova	  and	  Petukhov	  (2006)	  found	  that	  the	  populace	  of	  Russia	  is	  generally	  tolerant	  
towards	  corruption.	  This	  suggests	  that	  some	  effort	  is	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  motivate	  Russia’s	  
society	  to	  overcome	  corruption.	  
Through	  a	  survey	  conducted	  by	  the	  Russian	  Center	  for	  Public	  Research,	  Kofanova	  &	  
Petukhov	  (2006)	  found	  that	  Russians	  who	  were	  asked	  about	  fourteen	  issues	  affecting	  their	  
economy	  saw	  corruption	  as	  the	  most	  significant	  issue	  preventing	  their	  nation	  from	  achieving	  
prosperity.	  Even	  with	  this	  perception,	  they	  found	  that	  the	  respondents	  had	  more	  anxiety	  over	  
other	  problems	  less	  problematic	  to	  the	  economy	  such	  as	  the	  spread	  of	  alcoholism	  and	  narcotics	  
abuse.12	  While	  these	  issues	  are	  important	  to	  address,	  corruption	  is	  one	  of	  the	  greatest	  
problems	  that	  Russian	  political	  elites	  face.	  
As	  mentioned	  previously,	  Michelle	  Man	  (2009)	  found	  that	  Russia	  needs	  to	  involve	  its	  
citizens	  better	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  corruption.	  Overall,	  she	  recommends	  that	  Russia	  should	  do	  
the	  following	  five	  things:	  “increase	  transparency	  and	  accountability	  in	  all	  levels	  of	  government;	  
improve	  legislative	  sanctions	  against	  corrupt	  behaviour;	  establish	  incentives	  for	  good	  
behaviour;	  facilitate	  a	  credible	  privatisation	  process;	  and	  strengthen	  civil	  society.”13	  Her	  
recommendations	  followed	  her	  discovery	  of	  President	  Yeltsin’s	  failure	  to	  effectively	  combat	  
corruption.	  In	  her	  eyes,	  the	  source	  of	  his	  failures	  was	  that	  he	  focused	  on	  prosecuting	  individuals	  
while	  failing	  to	  open	  a	  dialogue	  with	  society.	  	  
Yeltsin	  was	  not	  the	  only	  president	  that	  faltered	  in	  this	  regard.	  Man	  (2009)	  also	  noted	  
that	  Putin	  failed	  to	  engage	  society	  “in	  shaping	  anti-­‐corruption	  policies.”14	  Much	  of	  his	  policies	  
                                                
12	  Kofanova	  &	  Petukhov,	  Public	  Opinion	  of	  Corruption	  in	  Russia,	  24-­‐25.	  
13	  Michelle	  Man,	  Political	  Corruption	  in	  Russia,	  1.	  






dealt	  with	  expanding	  government	  to	  handle	  the	  issues	  of	  corruption	  –	  an	  action	  that	  ended	  up	  
expanding	  corruption	  through	  increasing	  the	  amount	  of	  bureaucrats	  by	  which	  corruption	  could	  
occur.	  Such	  moves	  did	  not	  involve	  Russian	  society	  in	  forming	  and	  enforcing	  anti-­‐corruption	  
policies	  which	  Man	  suggests	  would	  have	  been	  successful.	  	  
Holmes	  (2008)	  expounds	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  Russian	  presidents	  committing	  
themselves	  to	  the	  fight.	  He	  argues	  “that	  political	  will	  is	  a	  necessary	  but	  not	  sufficient	  condition	  
for	  reducing	  corruption.”15	  Holmes	  (2008)	  also	  understands	  that	  it	  is	  important	  for	  the	  
president	  to	  gain	  support	  from	  society.	  That	  is	  why	  he	  concludes	  his	  research	  with	  a	  warning	  
about	  the	  danger	  of	  Russian	  presidents	  promising	  to	  fight	  corruption	  and	  not	  being	  able	  to	  
fulfill	  their	  promise.	  In	  providing	  this	  warning,	  he	  is	  suggesting	  that	  Medvedev	  needed	  to	  follow	  
through	  with	  his	  promises	  to	  battle	  corruption	  because	  Putin	  was	  unsuccessful	  with	  similar	  
promises.16	  	  
Several	  organizations	  measuring	  corruption	  in	  Russia	  such	  as	  Transparency	  
International’s	  Corruption	  Perception	  Indexes17	  and	  Freedom	  House’s	  (FH’s)	  Nations	  in	  Transit18	  
produced	  data	  that	  suggested	  corruption	  grew	  worse	  during	  the	  second	  half	  of	  Putin’s	  time	  as	  
president	  from	  2000-­‐2008	  even	  though	  he	  promised	  that	  he	  would	  fight	  corruption	  during	  his	  
presidency.	  This	  suggests	  that	  Putin	  did	  not	  fulfill	  his	  promises	  and	  that	  his	  efforts	  did	  not	  work.	  
Either	  way,	  that	  is	  what	  Holmes	  is	  conveying	  –	  Russian	  presidents	  need	  to	  fulfill	  the	  promises	  
they	  make	  to	  society.	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  and	  Organised	  Crime	  in	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  Russia,	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16	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17	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Boris	  Demidov	  (2005)	  provided	  a	  different	  insight	  into	  Russian	  corruption	  and	  how	  it	  
relates	  to	  Putin.	  Demidov	  (2005)	  looked	  at	  the	  role	  of	  Putin’s	  presidential	  envoys	  to	  Russia’s	  
Okrugs	  (territorial	  divisions	  in	  Russia)19	  and	  how	  these	  envoys	  were	  unable	  to	  effect	  a	  change	  in	  
Russia’s	  corruption	  problem.	  Although	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  envoys	  were	  different	  than	  fighting	  
corruption,	  Demidov	  (2005)	  suggests	  that	  this	  was	  one	  of	  the	  objectives	  that	  Putin	  intended.	  	  
Demidov	  (2005)	  found	  the	  envoys’	  efforts	  to	  exercise	  reforms	  were	  minimal	  largely	  
because	  the	  envoys	  were	  tasked	  with	  other	  concerns	  from	  the	  central	  government.	  He	  also	  
found	  the	  envoys	  were	  too	  weak	  to	  effectively	  institute	  change	  which	  lessened	  the	  chances	  for	  
the	  federal	  government	  to	  introduce	  consistent	  anti-­‐corruption	  reforms.	  	  
Demidov	  (2005)	  ultimately	  suggests	  that	  the	  weakness	  of	  the	  envoys	  kept	  the	  central	  
government	  from	  initiating	  consistent	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  which	  was	  possible	  if	  the	  envoys	  
were	  more	  powerful.	  The	  fact	  that	  they	  were	  so	  weak	  and	  that	  Putin	  did	  not	  include	  anti-­‐
corruption	  efforts	  as	  the	  main	  objectives	  provides	  evidence	  for	  his	  failure	  to	  fulfill	  his	  promise	  
to	  fight	  corruption.	  
More	  importantly,	  Demidov	  (2005)	  believes	  that	  corruption	  grew	  “in	  direct	  correlation	  
to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  level	  of	  government.”20	  Not	  only	  were	  the	  envoys	  ineffective	  in	  
producing	  changes,	  they	  enlarged	  the	  bureaucracy.	  Putin	  enhanced	  the	  chances	  for	  corruption	  
through	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  central	  government.	  The	  envoys	  failed	  and	  Putin’s	  anti-­‐corruption	  
battle	  remained	  unsuccessful.	  This	  particular	  issue	  is	  significant	  because	  it	  supports	  other	  
research	  (Orttung	  2006)	  that	  suggests	  Putin’s	  efforts	  to	  change	  corruption,	  by	  expanding	  the	  
central	  government,	  actually	  increased	  the	  occurrence	  of	  corruption.	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Robert	  Orttung	  (2006)	  found	  that	  in	  connection	  with	  increasing	  the	  size	  of	  the	  central	  
government,	  the	  Kremlin’s	  tightened	  grip	  on	  the	  media	  and	  NGOs	  produced	  a	  negative	  effect	  
on	  necessary	  oversight	  of	  the	  government.	  This	  created	  “extensive	  grounds	  for	  corruption.”21	  
Because	  Putin	  allowed	  the	  restriction	  of	  the	  media	  and	  NGOs,	  these	  organizations	  were	  limited	  
in	  their	  ability	  to	  expose	  corrupt	  government	  actions.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  that	  these	  
findings	  show	  an	  increase	  of	  corruption	  during	  Putin’s	  time	  as	  president,	  and	  that	  he	  prevented	  
media	  and	  NGO	  oversight	  of	  the	  government.	  Thus,	  Putin’s	  promises	  appear	  to	  be	  little	  more	  
than	  rhetoric	  unfulfilled.	  	  
Michelle	  Man	  (2009)	  provides	  similar	  historical	  insight	  that	  supports	  unfulfilled	  
presidential	  promises	  when	  she	  describes	  anti-­‐corruption	  measures	  by	  President	  Boris	  Yeltsin.	  
Man	  (2009)	  explains	  that	  “it	  was	  widely	  recognized	  that	  [Yeltsin’s]	  policies	  constituted	  political	  
measures	  levelled	  at	  his	  opposition.”22	  This	  statement	  was	  made	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Yeltsin’s	  
efforts	  to	  fight	  corruption.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  understood	  that	  Man	  (2009)	  implies	  that	  Yeltsin	  used	  the	  
fight	  against	  corruption	  as	  a	  way	  to	  strike	  at	  his	  opponents.	  In	  relation	  to	  Putin’s	  promises,	  the	  
example	  taken	  from	  Man	  (2009)	  coincides	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  political	  elites	  will	  use	  the	  fight	  
against	  corruption	  for	  political	  gain.	  	  
Although	  the	  idea	  of	  promoting	  an	  anti-­‐corruption	  campaign	  for	  political	  gain	  was	  not	  
the	  purpose	  of	  Man’s	  (2009)	  paper,	  such	  findings	  provide	  an	  understanding	  of	  why	  it	  is	  
important	  to	  recognize	  the	  difference	  between	  perceived	  corruption	  and	  actual	  incidents	  of	  
corruption.	  Even	  when	  the	  president	  of	  Russia	  claims	  that	  he	  will	  fight	  corruption,	  it	  does	  not	  
mean	  that	  he	  will	  fight	  it	  or	  fight	  it	  effectively.	  Therefore,	  it	  will	  be	  important	  for	  this	  study	  to	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look	  at	  the	  perceptions	  of	  Russian	  citizens	  that	  correlate	  with	  presidential	  actions	  thereby	  
learning	  which	  presidential	  actions	  are	  effective	  in	  motivating	  the	  populace	  and	  how	  such	  
perceptions	  may	  help	  in	  the	  actual	  fight.	  	  
Mishler	  &	  Rose	  (2010)	  addressed	  these	  issues	  and	  found	  that	  incidents	  of	  bribery	  did	  
not	  necessarily	  alter	  public	  perceptions	  of	  corruption.	  In	  other	  words,	  levels	  of	  corruption	  and	  
perceived	  levels	  of	  corruption	  do	  not	  fully	  correlate.	  Mishler	  &	  Rose	  (2010)	  learned	  that	  
incidents	  of	  paying	  bribes	  to	  public	  officials	  did	  not	  change	  the	  perceptions	  of	  Russian	  citizens	  
when	  compared	  to	  citizens	  who	  did	  not	  experience	  paying	  bribes.	  Rather,	  other	  factors	  were	  
more	  influential	  in	  respondents’	  perceptions	  of	  corruption.	  Some	  factors	  that	  have	  a	  more	  
powerful	  influence	  on	  perception	  than	  incidents	  of	  paying	  a	  bribe	  include	  the	  media,	  friends,	  
and	  neighbors.23	  This	  leads	  us	  to	  conclude	  that	  perceptions	  of	  corruption	  are	  not	  completely	  
accurate	  because	  Russians	  are	  not	  affected	  by	  actual	  incidents	  of	  bribery	  as	  much	  as	  they	  are	  
affected	  by	  the	  opinions	  of	  others.	  
Even	  so,	  Mishler	  &	  Rose	  (2010)	  fail	  to	  recognize	  that	  there	  are	  other	  ways	  in	  which	  
incidents	  of	  corruption	  may	  occur.	  For	  example,	  it	  also	  occurs	  when	  a	  politician	  favors	  one	  
contractor	  over	  another	  solely	  because	  of	  personal	  ties,	  or	  when	  a	  professional	  provides	  
services	  to	  an	  individual	  who	  bribes	  the	  professional	  with	  something	  other	  than	  money.	  
Therefore,	  their	  study	  is	  not	  all	  inclusive	  when	  considering	  incidents	  of	  corruption	  because	  they	  
merely	  use	  incidents	  of	  paying	  bribes.	  	  
Overall,	  Mishler	  &	  Rose	  (2010)	  come	  closest	  to	  this	  study’s	  topic	  because	  they	  look	  at	  
the	  correlation	  between	  Russians’	  views	  of	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  political	  regime	  and	  their	  view	  on	  
                                                






how	  corrupt	  the	  political	  system	  was.	  They	  found	  that	  Russians	  who	  experienced	  corruption	  by	  
paying	  bribes	  themselves	  did	  not	  associate	  such	  experiences	  with	  their	  perception	  of	  the	  
Russian	  regime.	  Thus,	  there	  may	  be	  some	  value	  in	  looking	  at	  the	  perceptions	  of	  Russians	  
without	  determining	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  personally	  participated	  in	  a	  bribe.	  Even	  though	  
Mishler	  and	  Rose	  look	  at	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  political	  elite	  and	  perceptions	  of	  society	  they	  
do	  not	  look	  specifically	  at	  Russian	  presidents	  and	  how	  the	  efforts	  of	  Russian	  presidents	  affect	  
the	  perceptions	  of	  Russian	  citizens.	  
As	  for	  other	  studies	  (Belousova,	  et	  al	  2011,	  Demidov	  2005,	  Kofanova	  &	  Petukhov	  2006,	  
and	  Orttung	  2006)	  who	  have	  looked	  at	  perceptions	  as	  a	  way	  to	  gauge	  the	  level	  of	  corruption	  in	  
Russia,	  it	  does	  not	  appear	  that	  they	  look	  at	  the	  correlation	  between	  the	  efforts	  of	  Russian	  
presidents	  to	  fight	  corruption	  and	  the	  perceptions	  of	  Russian	  citizens	  on	  those	  efforts.	  
Therefore,	  this	  study	  will	  take	  a	  look	  at	  this	  particular	  aspect	  of	  the	  corruption	  issue	  in	  Russia.	  
Hypothesis	  and	  Methods	  
	  	  
	   Man	  (2009),	  Kofanova	  &	  Petukhov	  (2006),	  &	  Orttung	  (2006)	  argue	  that	  Russian	  
presidents	  need	  to	  involve	  their	  society	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  corruption	  because	  of	  the	  powerful	  
oversight	  and	  support	  society	  is	  capable	  of	  providing.	  This	  will	  be	  difficult	  for	  presidents	  to	  
achieve	  because	  there	  is	  a	  high	  tolerance	  for	  corruption	  among	  Russia’s	  society.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  
important	  that	  we	  understand	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  government,	  specifically	  the	  
President	  and	  the	  Russian	  people.	  If	  Russian	  presidents	  are	  able	  to	  inform	  their	  citizens	  about	  
the	  dangers	  of	  corruption	  and	  motivate	  them	  to	  actively	  participate,	  there	  is	  a	  greater	  chance	  






	   This	  study	  looks	  at	  the	  effects	  on	  the	  perceptions	  of	  Russian	  society	  when	  Presidents	  
Putin	  and	  Medvedev	  instituted	  reforms	  to	  fight	  corruption.	  Specifically,	  it	  will	  strive	  to	  answer	  
whether	  or	  not	  Putin	  and	  Medvedev’s	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  improved	  perceptions	  of	  the	  
Russian	  people	  about	  corruption.	  In	  short,	  did	  Putin	  and/or	  Medvedev	  cause	  the	  Russian	  
people	  to	  perceive	  Russia	  as	  any	  less	  corrupt?	  
The	  dependent	  variable	  for	  this	  study	  is	  the	  perception	  of	  Russian	  citizens	  towards	  the	  
effectiveness	  of	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts.	  The	  independent	  variables	  are	  the	  efforts	  of	  presidents	  
Putin	  and	  Medvedev	  to	  fight	  corruption.	  	  
	   In	  order	  to	  evaluate	  the	  perceptions	  of	  Russian	  citizens	  this	  study	  uses	  survey	  data	  
gathered	  by	  one	  of	  the	  most	  noted	  anti-­‐corruption	  organizations	  in	  the	  world,	  Transparency	  
International	  (TI).	  A	  considerable	  amount	  of	  data	  from	  TI	  comes	  from	  its	  Global	  Corruption	  
Barometers	  (GCB).	  In	  this	  study,	  the	  data	  from	  the	  GCBs	  is	  compared	  with	  data	  on	  presidential	  
efforts	  to	  fight	  corruption.	  The	  data	  comes	  from	  information	  gleaned	  from	  the	  President	  of	  
Russia	  website	  and	  the	  Moscow	  Times.	  	  
The	  GCBs	  provide	  data	  from	  surveys	  conducted	  among	  Russian	  citizens.	  The	  surveys	  ask	  
respondents	  questions	  that	  relate	  to	  how	  they	  perceive	  corruption	  in	  their	  country.	  This	  study	  
will	  focus	  specifically	  on	  three	  questions.	  The	  first	  question	  asks	  respondents	  what	  they	  think	  
will	  happen	  to	  the	  level	  of	  corruption	  in	  Russia	  over	  the	  next	  three	  years,	  the	  second	  asks	  what	  
they	  think	  happened	  to	  corruption	  in	  the	  past	  three	  years,	  and	  the	  third	  asks	  respondents	  how	  
effective	  the	  Russian	  government	  is	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  corruption.	  
	   From	  these	  three	  questions,	  Transparency	  International	  provides	  a	  percentage	  that	  






compared	  with	  information	  about	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  of	  Putin	  and	  Medvedev.	  Although	  the	  
information	  from	  the	  President	  of	  Russia	  website	  and	  Moscow	  Times	  is	  not	  accessed	  in	  the	  
Russian	  language,	  these	  sites	  are	  managed	  by	  the	  Russian	  government	  or	  by	  Russians	  and	  the	  
information	  they	  provide	  in	  English	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  reliable	  depiction	  of	  what	  appears	  in	  
the	  Russian-­‐language	  press.	  	  
	   These	  sources	  were	  used	  to	  gain	  information	  about	  Putin	  and	  Medvedev’s	  anti-­‐
corruption	  efforts	  by	  performing	  an	  online	  search	  to	  pinpoint	  relevant	  articles	  mentioning	  
efforts	  by	  the	  two	  presidents.	  Specifically,	  the	  words	  “Medvedev	  Corruption”	  were	  used	  to	  find	  
articles	  making	  mention	  of	  Medvedev’s	  efforts,	  and	  the	  words	  “Putin	  Corruption”	  to	  find	  
articles	  mentioning	  Putin’s	  efforts.	  
	   The	  results	  of	  these	  searches	  were	  then	  recorded,	  and	  the	  title	  and	  summary	  of	  the	  
articles	  reviewed	  to	  find	  which	  articles	  provided	  an	  example	  of	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  by	  the	  
presidents.	  With	  this	  information,	  four	  charts	  were	  created.24	  There	  are	  two	  types	  of	  charts:	  the	  
first	  type	  reveals	  the	  amount	  of	  articles	  that	  mention	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  from	  each	  
president,	  and	  the	  second	  type	  reveals	  how	  many	  times	  different	  categories	  of	  anti-­‐corruption	  
efforts	  appear	  from	  the	  following	  list:	  
1) Action	  or	  voiced	  action	  based	  on	  firing,	  replacing,	  or	  enacting	  legislation	  to	  remove	  
power	  from	  an	  individual(s)	  for	  reasons	  to	  fight	  corruption,	  	  
2) Action	  or	  voiced	  action	  based	  on	  cutting	  or	  ordering	  to	  cut	  the	  number	  of	  
government	  employees	  to	  prevent	  corruption,	  
3) Action	  or	  voiced	  action	  based	  on	  requiring	  government	  employees	  to	  declare	  
income	  &/or	  limit	  income,	  
4) Action	  or	  voiced	  action	  based	  on	  ordering	  or	  enacting	  reform	  to	  diminish	  corruption,	  	  
5) Action	  or	  voiced	  action	  based	  on	  anti-­‐corruption	  legislation	  or	  undefined	  anti-­‐
corruption	  decree,	  	  
                                                






6) Action	  or	  voiced	  action	  based	  on	  receiving,	  revealing,	  redefining	  plan(s)	  to	  fight	  
corruption,	  
7) Action	  or	  voiced	  action	  based	  on	  investigating	  or	  ordering	  an	  investigation	  to	  find	  
out	  corruption	  or	  punish	  those	  guilty	  of	  corruption,	  	  
8) Action	  or	  voiced	  action	  based	  on	  a	  pledged	  commitment	  or	  a	  mention	  of	  the	  
importance	  to	  fight	  corruption,	  
9) Action	  or	  voiced	  action	  based	  on	  urging	  or	  ordering	  others	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  
corruption,	  	  
10) Action	  or	  voiced	  action	  based	  on	  reprimanding	  others	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  corruption,	  	  
11) Action	  or	  voiced	  action	  based	  on	  raising	  government	  employee's	  income,	  
12) Action	  or	  voiced	  action	  based	  on	  the	  creation	  or	  involvement	  of	  a	  committee,	  
council,	  or	  the	  like	  to	  fight	  corruption,	  
13) Action	  or	  voiced	  action	  based	  on	  delegating	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  to	  others,	  	  
14) Action	  or	  voiced	  action	  based	  on	  high	  level	  anti-­‐corruption	  conversation	  with	  others,	  
15) Action	  or	  voiced	  action	  based	  on	  implementing	  international	  anti-­‐corruption	  laws,	  	  
16) Action	  or	  voiced	  action	  based	  on	  establishing	  a	  reserve	  of	  qualified	  personnel	  for	  the	  
president,	  and	  
17) Action	   or	   voiced	   action	   based	   on	   removing	   certain	   powers	   from	   an	   individual(s)	  
based	  on	  corruption.	  
	  	  
	   By	  charting	  the	  amount	  of	  articles	  that	  mention	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  for	  each	  
president	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  determine	  the	  amount	  of	  effort	  exhibited	  by	  each	  president.	  By	  
charting	  how	  many	  times	  different	  categories	  appear	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  see	  how	  different	  types	  of	  
efforts	  to	  fight	  corruption	  may	  have	  affected	  perceptions.	  	  
	  	   If	  Russian	  presidents	  are	  able	  to	  affect	  perceptions,	  they	  could	  become	  a	  valuable	  asset	  
in	  the	  fight	  against	  corruption,	  and	  they	  might	  help	  to	  change	  the	  perception	  that	  corruption	  is	  
a	  common	  and	  unalterable	  part	  of	  Russian	  society.	  The	  next	  section	  will	  compare	  the	  results	  of	  
the	  data	  from	  the	  GCBs	  and	  the	  presidential	  efforts	  in	  the	  media.	  
Results	  
	   First,	  we	  examine	  the	  data	  on	  Russian	  expectations	  about	  corruption	  during	  President	  
Putin’s	  first	  two	  terms.	  Then,	  I	  compare	  these	  perceptions	  with	  his	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts.	  






Following	  that,	  I	  compare	  their	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  with	  such	  data.	  Third,	  I	  look	  at	  how	  
general	  corruption	  changed	  throughout	  Russia	  under	  Medvedev,	  and	  how	  this	  compares	  to	  his	  
anti-­‐corruption	  efforts.	  Finally,	  I	  look	  at	  the	  articles	  from	  the	  President	  of	  Russia	  website	  along	  
with	  the	  articles	  from	  the	  Moscow	  Times	  and	  compare	  them	  with	  perceptions	  of	  Russians.	  
Perceptions	  of	  Corruption	  under	  Putin	  
In	  this	  section	  I	  present	  the	  results	  for	  the	  first	  two	  questions	  in	  the	  surveys.	  
Respondents	  from	  the	  surveys	  conducted	  in	  2002,	  2004,	  2005,	  and	  200725	  were	  asked	  if	  they	  
expected	  the	  level	  of	  corruption	  to	  change	  in	  the	  next	  three	  years.	  	  Of	  those	  surveyed	  in	  2002,	  
only	  29.2%	  of	  respondents	  indicated	  that	  corruption	  would	  stay	  the	  same	  (see	  Figure	  1).	  For	  
that	  same	  survey	  46%	  of	  Russians	  thought	  corruption	  would	  increase.	  In	  2004,	  41%	  thought	  
corruption	  would	  stay	  the	  same,	  an	  almost	  12%	  difference	  from	  2002,	  but	  those	  who	  perceived	  
corruption	  would	  increase	  dropped,	  equaling	  38%.	  In	  2005,	  those	  who	  said	  corruption	  would	  
stay	  the	  same	  were	  34%.	  Yet,	  there	  was	  a	  noticeable	  rise	  of	  12%	  for	  those	  who	  viewed	  
corruption	  as	  increasing	  equaling	  50%	  total.	  In	  2007,	  the	  amount	  of	  those	  who	  saw	  corruption	  
staying	  the	  same	  rose	  to	  40%	  while	  those	  who	  saw	  corruption	  as	  increasing	  was	  45%.	  How	  
Russians	  perceived	  corruption	  to	  increase	  or	  stay	  the	  same	  from	  one	  survey	  to	  the	  next	  
fluctuated	  a	  lot,	  telling	  us	  there	  might	  be	  something	  affecting	  this	  fluctuation.	  
                                                
25	  These	  were	  the	  only	  years	  the	  question,	  “Do	  you	  expect	  the	  level	  of	  corruption	  to	  change	  in	  the	  next	  three	  








The	  survey	  from	  the	  2003	  GCB	  was	  conducted	  in	  2002.26	  
	  
From	  2002	  to	  at	  least	  2005	  Putin	  was	  not	  able	  to	  make	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  how	  
Russians	  viewed	  overall	  corruption,	  but	  Putin	  might	  have	  something	  to	  do	  with	  the	  fluctuation	  
of	  percentages.	  	  
The	  second	  question	  asks,	  “In	  the	  past	  three	  years,	  how	  has	  the	  level	  of	  corruption	  in	  
this	  country	  changed?”27	  During	  Putin’s	  two	  terms	  this	  question	  was	  asked	  once	  in	  2005.	  In	  
reply	  to	  this	  question,	  88%	  of	  respondents	  in	  2005	  said	  that	  corruption	  stayed	  the	  same	  or	  that	  
it	  increased	  over	  the	  past	  three	  years.	  Thus,	  Russians	  perceived	  that	  corruption	  stayed	  the	  
same	  or	  increased	  in	  the	  preceding	  three	  years	  by	  4%	  more	  than	  those	  who	  believed	  corruption	  
would	  stay	  the	  same	  or	  increase	  during	  the	  three	  years	  after	  the	  survey.28	  Both	  figures	  are	  high,	  
and	  it	  suggests	  that	  only	  a	  small	  percentage	  of	  Russians	  viewed	  the	  past	  more	  negatively	  than	  
                                                
26	  Information	  and	  data	  for	  this	  chart	  comes	  from	  the	  following	  sources:	  GCB	  2003:	  Technical	  Information.	  
Transparency	  International.	  GCB	  2003.	  Appendix	  5.	  Transparency	  International;	  GCB	  2004.	  Annex	  IV:	  Table	  17.	  
Transparency	  International;	  GCB	  2005.	  Annex	  I:	  Table	  12.	  Transparency	  International;	  GCB	  2007.	  Appendix	  4:	  Table	  
4.3.	  Transparency	  International.	  
27	  Global	  Corruption	  Barometer	  2005.	  Annex	  II;	  Questionnaire.	  Transparency	  International.	  





















GCB	  2003	   GCB	  2004	   GCB	  2005	   GCB	  2007	  
Figure	  1	  -­‐	  Survey	  results	  from	  the	  quesBon,	  "Do	  you	  expect	  the	  level	  of	  corrupBon	  
to	  change	  in	  the	  next	  three	  years?":	  
Increase	  	  
Stay	  the	  same	  	  
Decrease	  	  






they	  did	  the	  future.	  Overall,	  most	  Russians	  were	  not	  positive	  about	  how	  the	  battle	  against	  
corruption	  was	  playing	  out	  in	  Russia,	  and	  this	  question	  emphasizes	  how	  poorly	  corruption	  was	  
viewed	  in	  2005.	  
This	  data	  from	  both	  questions	  signifies	  the	  low	  expectations	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  
corruption	  during	  the	  first	  part	  of	  Putin’s	  second	  term,	  and	  Russians	  did	  not	  express	  much	  hope	  
for	  change	  beyond	  this.	  Even	  so,	  there	  are	  some	  trends	  of	  shifting	  percentages	  that	  suggest	  the	  
perceptions	  of	  a	  number	  of	  Russians	  changed.	  The	  following	  section	  discloses	  the	  potential	  
ways	  that	  Russians	  were	  persuaded	  by	  Putin’s	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts.	  
The	  Impact	  of	  Putin’s	  Efforts	  on	  Perceptions	  of	  Corruption	  
There	  are	  two	  significant	  findings	  evident	  from	  comparing	  Putin’s	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  
with	  the	  perceptions	  of	  Russians	  from	  the	  2003,	  2004,	  2005,	  and	  2007	  GCBs.	  First,	  there	  is	  a	  
correlation	  between	  perceptions	  of	  corruption	  and	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  based	  on	  firing,	  
replacing,	  and	  enacting	  legislation	  to	  fire	  individuals	  for	  reasons	  of	  corruption.	  Second,	  there	  is	  
a	  correlation	  between	  the	  amount	  of	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  exhibited	  within	  a	  two	  month	  
period	  prior	  to	  a	  survey	  and	  the	  perception	  of	  corruption.	  
For	  these	  findings	  I	  compare	  information	  about	  Putin’s	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  from	  the	  
Moscow	  Times	  with	  the	  GCB	  survey	  results,	  but	  I	  drop	  the	  use	  of	  the	  President	  of	  Russia	  
website	  because	  it	  did	  not	  produce	  enough	  information	  for	  Putin.	  Also,	  the	  survey	  for	  the	  2007	  
GCB	  is	  difficult	  to	  interpret	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  two	  out	  of	  the	  three	  years	  following	  the	  2007	  
survey	  Putin	  was	  not	  the	  president,	  making	  it	  the	  only	  survey	  where	  a	  question	  goes	  beyond	  his	  
presidency.	  During	  the	  time	  of	  this	  survey,	  it	  was	  not	  known	  who	  would	  fill	  the	  presidency	  after	  






Medvedev,	  but	  the	  overlap	  between	  Putin	  and	  Medvedev	  should	  make	  us	  cautious	  in	  using	  this	  
data	  to	  interpret	  Putin’s	  efforts	  on	  Russian	  perceptions.	  	  
The	  first	  finding	  starts	  in	  2002,	  2005,	  and	  2007	  when	  Russians	  perceived	  corruption	  
would	  increase	  the	  most	  over	  a	  three	  year	  period.	  During	  these	  years,	  Putin	  frequently	  fired,	  
replaced,	  or	  worked	  to	  enact	  legislation	  giving	  him	  power	  to	  fire	  certain	  individuals	  for	  reasons	  
of	  corruption	  providing	  us	  with	  a	  correlation	  that	  such	  efforts	  affected	  perceptions	  of	  increased	  
corruption.	  	  	  
The	  lowest	  percentage	  of	  Russians	  who	  perceived	  corruption	  would	  increase	  was	  
recorded	  in	  2004.	  This	  was	  the	  only	  year	  in	  which	  surveys	  were	  conducted	  that	  Putin	  did	  not	  
exhibit	  efforts	  based	  on	  firing,	  replacing,	  or	  enacting	  legislation	  to	  fire	  individuals	  for	  reasons	  of	  
corruption	  (see	  Figure	  2).	  	  
	  
Data	  created	  from	  articles	  retrieved	  from	  the	  Moscow	  Times’	  archive	  website.	  
	   	  	  
	   In	  2002	  46%	  of	  Russians	  perceived	  that	  corruption	  would	  increase29	  which	  is	  the	  second	  
highest	  total.	  In	  this	  same	  year	  there	  were	  four	  Moscow	  Times	  articles	  that	  mention	  Putin’s	  
efforts	  to	  fight	  corruption.	  Of	  those	  four,	  half	  of	  them	  dealt	  with	  efforts	  based	  on	  firing	  or	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   2005	   2007	  
Figure	  2	  -­‐	  Number	  of	  arBcles	  exhibiBng	  efforts	  based	  on	  firing	  or	  replacing	  
individual(s)	  in	  the	  Moscow	  Times	  
Number	  of	  arpcles	  exhibipng	  







replacing	  individuals.	  In	  one	  article	  Putin	  said	  that	  corrupt	  officers	  need	  to	  be	  chased	  out	  of	  the	  
force	  while	  the	  other	  mentioned	  that	  Putin	  had	  dismissed	  Yevgeny	  Adamov,	  Russian	  Minister	  of	  
the	  Ministry	  of	  Atomic	  Energy,30	  because	  of	  corruption	  allegations.	  	  
	   In	  the	  2005	  survey	  there	  were	  ten	  articles	  exhibiting	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts.	  Five	  out	  of	  
the	  ten	  articles	  dealt	  with	  Putin	  creating	  and	  finalizing	  a	  bill	  or	  bills	  allowing	  him	  to	  fire	  
governors	  and	  nullify	  their	  selection	  through	  popular	  vote.	  Another	  article	  discussed	  a	  bill	  that	  
conferred	  similar	  powers	  on	  Putin	  with	  regard	  to	  judges.	  This	  year	  also	  witnessed	  the	  most	  
drastic	  rise	  in	  expected	  corruption	  with	  a	  12%	  increase	  from	  the	  previous	  survey	  in	  2004.	  
	   In	  2007,	  one	  out	  of	  six	  anti-­‐corruption	  articles	  mentioned	  an	  effort	  by	  Putin	  to	  fire	  or	  
replace	  someone.	  This	  article	  mentioned	  the	  replacement	  of	  the	  prosecutor	  general	  of	  Russia.	  
In	  this	  year,	  45%	  perceived	  corruption	  would	  increase	  in	  the	  following	  three	  years31	  making	  this	  
survey	  the	  third	  highest	  percentage	  of	  those	  who	  perceived	  corruption	  would	  increase.	  	  The	  
correlation	  associated	  with	  this	  year	  is	  not	  as	  strong	  as	  others	  because	  there	  was	  only	  one	  
article,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  take	  away	  from	  the	  possibility	  that	  a	  correlation	  exists,	  especially	  when	  it	  
agrees	  with	  other	  years.	  Thus,	  the	  data	  suggest	  that	  the	  more	  Putin	  fires	  people	  for	  corruption,	  
the	  more	  a	  number	  of	  the	  public	  seems	  to	  perceive	  that	  corruption	  will	  intensify	  in	  the	  years	  
ahead.	  	  
Next,	  I	  look	  at	  the	  amount	  of	  articles	  that	  appear	  two	  months	  prior	  and	  leading	  up	  to	  
each	  survey.	  The	  combined	  percentages	  of	  Russians	  who	  perceived	  corruption	  stayed	  the	  same	  
along	  with	  those	  who	  perceived	  it	  increased	  are	  higher	  when	  there	  are	  fewer	  or	  no	  anti-­‐
corruption	  articles	  within	  the	  two	  months	  prior	  to	  a	  survey.	  	  
                                                
30	  “Yevgeny	  Adamov.”	  Stolen	  Asset	  Recovery	  Initiative	  (StAR).	  The	  World	  Bank	  –	  UNODC.	  Web.	  28	  October	  2013.	  	  






There	  was	  no	  correlation	  between	  efforts	  that	  appeared	  within	  a	  year	  before	  each	  
survey	  and	  perceptions	  of	  Russians.	  Thus,	  I	  looked	  at	  the	  two	  month	  period	  prior	  to	  each	  
survey.	  I	  realized	  Russians	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  remember	  the	  articles	  that	  appear	  within	  a	  
shorter	  range	  to	  the	  surveys.	  Therefore,	  the	  survey	  results	  are	  likely	  affected	  by	  what	  
respondents	  view	  within	  two	  months	  prior	  to	  a	  survey	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  year.	  	  
From	  the	  articles	  that	  fall	  within	  a	  two	  month	  period,	  only	  one	  mentioned	  an	  effort	  
about	  getting	  rid	  of	  (firing)	  individuals	  for	  reasons	  of	  corruption.	  One	  might	  be	  inclined	  to	  say	  
these	  articles	  did	  not	  affect	  survey	  results	  because	  they	  were	  not	  within	  two	  months	  prior	  to	  a	  
survey.	  This	  might	  be	  true	  although	  this	  type	  of	  effort	  is	  very	  common	  in	  Russia	  making	  it	  likely	  
that	  respondents	  remembered	  it	  with	  greater	  ease	  than	  any	  other	  types.	  Besides	  that,	  this	  type	  
of	  effort	  was	  used	  more	  than	  any	  other,	  and	  it	  was	  the	  only	  type	  of	  effort	  that	  correlated	  with	  
perceptions.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  its	  wide	  use	  allowed	  respondents	  to	  not	  forget	  it	  when	  answering	  
surveys.	  	  	  
When	  I	  looked	  at	  the	  results	  from	  the	  surveys	  I	  saw	  that	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  by	  Putin	  
did	  not	  correlate	  with	  the	  fluctuation	  of	  how	  respondents	  viewed	  corruption	  would	  increase	  or	  
stay	  the	  same,	  but	  when	  I	  combined	  how	  respondents	  viewed	  corruption	  would	  increase	  and	  
stay	  the	  same	  there	  was	  a	  correlation.	  The	  correlation	  showed	  the	  amount	  of	  articles	  that	  
appeared	  two	  months	  prior	  to	  each	  survey	  reacted	  to	  how	  respondents	  viewed	  corruption	  
would	  increase	  and	  stay	  the	  same.	  	  
In	  2002	  there	  were	  two	  anti-­‐corruption	  articles	  within	  the	  two	  months	  prior	  to	  the	  
survey,	  in	  2004	  there	  was	  one	  anti-­‐corruption	  article	  two	  months	  prior,	  and	  in	  2005	  and	  2007	  






percentages	  of	  respondents	  who	  said	  corruption	  would	  increase	  and	  stay	  the	  same.	  In	  2002	  the	  
combined	  percentages	  equaled	  75.2%,	  in	  2004	  it	  was	  79%,	  in	  2005	  it	  was	  84%,	  and	  in	  2007	  the	  
total	  was	  85%	  (see	  Figure	  3a).	  This	  means	  there	  was	  a	  gradual	  increase	  of	  those	  who	  believed	  
corruption	  would	  increase	  and	  stay	  the	  same	  as	  opposed	  to	  those	  who	  viewed	  corruption	  
decreased.	  This	  follows	  the	  gradual	  decrease	  of	  articles	  that	  appear	  two	  months	  prior	  to	  a	  
survey.	  
	  
Data	  created	  from	  articles	  retrieved	  from	  the	  Moscow	  Times’	  archive	  website.	  
	  
	  
The	  survey	  from	  the	  2003	  GCB	  was	  conducted	  in	  2002.32	  	  
	  
                                                
32	  Information	  and	  data	  for	  this	  chart	  comes	  from	  the	  following	  sources:	  GCB	  2003:	  Technical	  Information.	  
Transparency	  International;	  GCB	  2003.	  Appendix	  5.	  Transparency	  International;	  GCB	  2004.	  Annex	  IV:	  Table	  17.	  
Transparency	  International;	  GCB	  2005.	  Annex	  I:	  Table	  12.	  Transparency	  International;	  GCB	  2007.	  Appendix	  4:	  Table	  
4.3.	  Transparency	  International. 
2	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   2004	   2005	   2007	  
Figure	  3	  -­‐	  Amount	  of	  anB-­‐corrupBon	  arBcles	  in	  the	  Moscow	  Times	  that	  appear	  
two	  months	  prior	  to	  each	  survey	  
Number	  of	  arpcles	  
75%	  
79%	  






2003	  GCB	  	   2004	  GCB	  	   2005	  GCB	  	   2007	  GCB	  
Figure	  3a	  -­‐	  Percentage	  of	  respondents	  indicaBng	  corrupBon	  would	  increase	  or	  
stay	  the	  same	  in	  the	  three	  years	  following	  each	  survey	  when	  asked,	  "Do	  you	  
expect	  the	  level	  of	  corrupBon	  to	  change	  in	  the	  next	  three	  years?"	  
Percentage	  of	  respondents	  
indicapng	  corruppon	  would	  






The	  reason	  I	  chose	  to	  combine	  the	  results	  for	  answer	  choices	  “increase”	  and	  “stay	  the	  
same”	  is	  to	  see	  how	  perceived	  corruption	  changed	  overall	  from	  one	  survey	  to	  the	  next.	  I	  believe	  
that	  these	  two	  categories,	  when	  combined,	  tell	  us	  how	  corrupt	  Russians	  believe	  their	  country	  
is.	  This	  is	  because	  whether	  corruption	  is	  increasing	  or	  staying	  the	  same,	  it	  is	  not	  decreasing.	  
Thereby,	  the	  corruption	  situation	  did	  not	  improve	  for	  these	  individuals.	  
	   From	  this	  data	  it	  appears	  that:	  1)	  when	  Putin	  exhibited	  efforts	  to	  fire,	  replace,	  and	  enact	  
legislation	  to	  replace	  governors	  as	  an	  anti-­‐corruption	  effort	  there	  is	  a	  correlation	  that	  the	  
perceptions	  of	  increased	  corruption	  grew	  slightly	  except	  in	  cases	  that	  involved	  the	  police,	  and	  
2)	  a	  small	  group	  of	  respondents	  were	  influenced	  by	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  that	  appeared	  
within	  a	  two	  month	  period	  prior	  to	  a	  survey	  in	  that	  they	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  indicate	  corruption	  
was	  staying	  the	  same	  or	  increasing.	  
Assessing	  Government	  Effectiveness	  under	  Putin	  and	  Medvedev	  
Another	  question	  from	  the	  GCB	  surveys	  asks,	  “How	  would	  you	  assess	  your	  current	  
government’s	  actions	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  corruption?”33	  This	  question	  is	  significant	  because	  it	  
can	  be	  linked	  more	  closely	  to	  the	  political	  regime	  in	  power	  at	  the	  time	  the	  question	  was	  asked.	  
The	  2006	  survey	  is	  the	  first	  time	  this	  question	  appears	  which	  is	  at	  the	  end	  of	  Putin’s	  presidency.	  
From	  there,	  it	  is	  asked	  in	  every	  survey	  up	  to	  the	  present	  time.	  The	  years	  the	  surveys	  are	  
conducted	  after	  2006	  are	  2007,	  2008,	  2010,	  and	  one	  in	  2013.	  Unfortunately,	  Transparency	  
International	  did	  not	  publish	  the	  exact	  week	  or	  month	  the	  surveys	  were	  conducted	  in	  2013	  
making	  it	  so	  we	  cannot	  make	  comparisons	  with	  it.	  	  
                                                
33	  Global	  Corruption	  Barometer	  2006.	  Annex	  I:	  Table	  5:	  How	  respondents	  assess	  their	  government’s	  fight	  against	  






	   In	  the	  survey	  conducted	  for	  the	  2006	  GCB,	  77%	  (see	  Figure	  4)	  of	  respondents	  indicated	  
that	  the	  government	  was	  either	  “not	  effective”,	  “does	  not	  fight	  at	  all”,	  or	  “does	  not	  fight	  but	  
actually	  encourages”	  corruption.34	  Thus,	  this	  data	  is	  not	  much	  different	  from	  what	  we	  saw	  with	  
perceptions	  about	  general	  corruption	  in	  previous	  years.	  Many	  are	  still	  skeptical	  about	  the	  




	   In	  2007	  the	  answer	  choices	  changed	  from	  how	  they	  were	  in	  the	  previous	  survey,	  and	  
instead	  of	  offering	  respondents	  the	  choices:	  “very	  effective”,	  “effective”,	  “not	  effective”,	  “does	  
not	  fight	  at	  all”,	  “does	  not	  fight	  but	  actually	  encourages”,	  and	  “don’t	  know/no	  answer”,	  the	  
respondents	  were	  offered	  three	  options:	  “effective”,	  “neither	  effective	  or	  ineffective”,	  and	  
“ineffective”.	  These	  three	  answer	  choices	  remain	  the	  same	  from	  2007	  to	  2013.	  
	   When	  looking	  at	  the	  results	  in	  2007	  we	  learn	  that	  the	  percentage	  of	  those	  who	  viewed	  
the	  government	  as	  effective	  was	  13%	  (see	  Figure	  5).	  This	  was	  the	  last	  year	  of	  Putin’s	  second	  
term	  in	  office,	  and	  it	  presents	  us	  with	  a	  7%	  decrease	  in	  government	  effectiveness	  from	  2006.	  	  
                                                
34	  GCB	  2006.	  Annex	  I:	  Table	  5.	  Transparency	  International.	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The	  survey	  for	  the	  2009	  GCB	  was	  conducted	  in	  November	  of	  2008	  and	  the	  survey	  for	  the	  2010-­‐11	  GCB	  was	  
conducted	  in	  June	  and	  July	  of	  2010.36	  	  
	  
Then,	  the	  2009	  GCB	  which	  gathered	  its	  information	  from	  a	  survey	  conducted	  in	  
November	  of	  2008	  informs	  us	  that	  the	  percentage	  of	  those	  who	  viewed	  the	  government’s	  
efforts	  as	  effective	  rose	  to	  22%.	  This	  was	  approximately	  halfway	  through	  Medvedev’s	  first	  year	  
as	  president,	  and	  government	  effectiveness	  totaled	  a	  9%	  increase.	  Then,	  in	  the	  2010	  survey	  it	  
rose	  by	  4%	  to	  26%.	  	  
In	  2007,	  50%	  of	  respondents	  viewed	  the	  government’s	  actions	  as	  ineffective,	  52%	  in	  
2008,	  and	  52%	  in	  2010.	  About	  half	  of	  the	  respondents	  continued	  to	  perceive	  anti-­‐corruption	  
actions	  unfavorably	  throughout	  these	  years.	  	  
Overall,	  there	  was	  a	  growing	  percentage	  of	  Russians	  who	  viewed	  the	  government’s	  
actions	  as	  effective	  while	  there	  was	  a	  much	  larger	  percentage	  that	  maintained	  a	  negative	  view	  
                                                
36	  Information	  and	  data	  for	  this	  chart	  comes	  from	  the	  following	  sources:	  Global	  Corruption	  Barometer	  2009.	  
Appendix	  A:	  Table	  I:	  Survey	  data.	  Transparency	  International;	  Global	  Corruption	  Barometer	  2010-­‐11.	  Appendix:	  A2:	  
2010	  and	  2011	  fieldwork	  details,	  by	  country.	  Transparency	  International;	  Global	  Corruption	  Barometer	  2007.	  
Appendix	  4:	  Table	  4.4:	  Respondents’	  evaluation	  of	  their	  government’s	  efforts	  to	  fight	  corruption.	  Transparency	  
International;	  Global	  Corruption	  Barometer	  2009.	  Appendix	  D:	  Table	  4:	  How	  would	  you	  assess	  your	  current	  
government’s	  actions	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  corruption?	  Transparency	  International;	  Global	  Corruption	  Barometer	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towards	  the	  government’s	  actions	  against	  corruption.	  This	  brings	  us	  to	  ask	  whether	  Putin’s	  anti-­‐
corruption	  efforts	  or	  the	  lack	  thereof,	  correlated	  with	  a	  decline	  in	  the	  percentages	  of	  those	  who	  
viewed	  the	  government’s	  actions	  as	  effective.	  Also,	  did	  Medvedev’s	  efforts	  correlate	  with	  the	  
increased	  perception	  that	  the	  government	  improved	  its	  fight	  against	  corruption?	  
Comparing	  Anti-­‐Corruption	  Efforts	  to	  Perceptions	  of	  Government	  Effectiveness	  
	   During	  Putin’s	  presidency,	  from	  2006	  to	  2007,	  there	  was	  a	  7%	  decrease	  in	  the	  
percentage	  of	  respondents	  who	  indicated	  the	  government	  was	  effective	  in	  its	  anti-­‐corruption	  
efforts.	  From	  2007	  to	  2010,	  under	  Medvedev,	  perceptions	  of	  government	  effectiveness	  
improved.	  What	  happened?	  A	  similar	  trend	  from	  perceptions	  of	  general	  corruption	  also	  applied	  
to	  perceptions	  of	  government	  effectiveness.	  Essentially,	  the	  percentage	  of	  respondents	  who	  
viewed	  the	  government	  as	  effective	  increased	  when	  the	  number	  of	  anti-­‐corruption	  articles	  
increased	  within	  the	  two	  month	  period	  prior	  to	  each	  survey.	  Yet,	  I	  found	  no	  correlation	  
between	  efforts	  to	  fire	  and	  replace	  individuals	  for	  reasons	  of	  corruption	  with	  regards	  this	  
question.	  
	   Under	  Putin’s	  presidency,	  within	  the	  two	  months	  prior	  to	  the	  2006	  survey	  there	  were	  
two	  anti-­‐corruption	  articles	  (see	  Figure	  6),	  and	  20%	  of	  respondents	  thought	  the	  government	  
was	  effective	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  corruption	  (see	  Figure	  6a).	  The	  2007	  survey	  indicated	  there	  
were	  no	  anti-­‐corruption	  articles	  that	  ran	  in	  the	  Moscow	  Times,	  and	  13%	  of	  respondents	  







Data	  created	  from	  articles	  retrieved	  from	  the	  Moscow	  Times’	  archive	  website.	  
	  
	  
The	  survey	  for	  the	  2009	  GCB	  was	  conducted	  in	  2008,	  and	  the	  survey	  for	  the	  2010-­‐11	  GCB	  was	  conducted	  in	  2010.37	  	  
	  
	   Under	  Medvedev,	  within	  the	  two	  month	  period	  prior	  to	  the	  2008	  survey,	  the	  Moscow	  
Times	  ran	  six	  articles	  covering	  his	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts.	  This	  is	  four	  more	  than	  any	  two	  month	  
period	  during	  Putin’s	  presidency.	  This	  could	  be	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  we	  saw	  a	  9%	  increase,	  from	  
2007	  to	  2008.	  	  	  	  	   	  
	   Then,	  during	  the	  two	  months	  prior	  to	  the	  survey	  in	  2010	  there	  were	  eight	  anti-­‐
corruption	  articles	  and	  a	  4%	  increase	  of	  respondents	  who	  perceived	  the	  government	  as	  
effective.	  A	  higher	  increase	  than	  4%	  might	  be	  expected.	  After	  all,	  the	  year	  Putin	  had	  two	  
                                                
37 Information	  and	  data	  for	  this	  chart	  comes	  from	  the	  following	  sources:	  GCB	  2009.	  Appendix	  A:	  Table	  I.	  
Transparency	  International;	  GCB	  2010-­‐11.	  Appendix:	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  International;	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  Annex	  I:	  Table	  5.	  
Transparency	  International;	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  Appendix	  4:	  Table	  4.4.	  Transparency	  International;	  GCB	  2009.	  Appendix	  D:	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  6	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  Times	  that	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  each	  survey	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articles,	  the	  percentage	  of	  respondents	  who	  viewed	  the	  government	  as	  effective	  was	  as	  high	  as	  
20%	  and	  for	  2010	  it	  was	  only	  26%	  with	  eight	  articles.	  This	  imbalance	  might	  exist	  simply	  because	  
the	  answer	  choices	  were	  different	  in	  2006,	  and	  the	  percentage	  could	  have	  been	  lower.	  	  
	   I	  found	  no	  correlation	  between	  efforts	  to	  fire	  and	  replace	  individuals	  and	  Medvedev’s	  
efforts.	  This	  question	  is	  covered	  in	  two	  sections	  from	  this	  one.	  	  	  
	   With	  the	  increase	  of	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  within	  a	  two	  month	  period	  prior	  to	  a	  survey	  
government	  effectiveness	  also	  increased.	  This	  finding	  is	  similar	  to	  what	  we	  found	  when	  looking	  
at	  corruption	  in	  general	  under	  Putin.	  Together,	  these	  findings	  convey	  that	  the	  presidents	  may	  
have	  influenced	  a	  small	  group	  of	  Russians	  to	  view	  the	  government	  as	  effective	  in	  the	  fight	  
against	  corruption,	  and	  to	  view	  corruption	  in	  general	  as	  improving.	  
Perceptions	  of	  Corruption	  under	  Medvedev	  
	   In	  the	  summer	  of	  2010,	  about	  two	  years	  into	  Medvedev’s	  presidency,	  Russians	  were	  
asked,	  “In	  the	  past	  three	  years,	  how	  has	  the	  level	  of	  corruption	  changed?”38	  The	  survey	  
conducted	  for	  the	  2013	  GCB	  asked	  the	  same	  question	  with	  one	  variation.	  Instead	  of	  asking	  
about	  the	  past	  three	  years	  it	  asked	  about	  the	  past	  two	  years.39	  These	  two	  questions	  tell	  a	  
partial	  story	  about	  general	  perceptions	  of	  corruption	  during	  the	  first	  half	  and	  the	  very	  end	  of	  
Medvedev’s	  presidency.	  	  
	   The	  2013	  Global	  Corruption	  Barometer	  from	  Transparency	  International	  does	  not	  
disclose	  the	  exact	  dates	  the	  survey	  was	  conducted	  in	  Russia;	  rather,	  it	  gives	  us	  a	  range	  from	  
                                                
38	  Global	  Corruption	  Barometer	  2010-­‐11.	  Question	  1:	  “In	  the	  past	  3	  years,	  how	  has	  the	  level	  of	  corruption	  in	  this	  
country	  changed?	  Transparency	  International.	  Web.	  7	  November,	  2013.	  






September	  2012	  to	  March	  201340.	  Because	  of	  this,	  we	  do	  not	  know	  precisely	  when	  the	  survey	  
was	  conducted	  and	  we	  do	  not	  know	  the	  exact	  time	  frame	  for	  the	  two	  years	  before	  it.	  This	  
makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  compare	  previous	  trends	  with	  data	  from	  this	  survey.	  All	  we	  can	  do	  is	  get	  a	  
general	  idea	  of	  where	  perceptions	  of	  corruption	  rest	  around	  the	  end	  of	  Medvedev’s	  presidency.	  	  
	   Of	  those	  who	  responded	  to	  the	  2010	  survey,	  92%	  perceived	  that	  corruption	  either	  
stayed	  the	  same	  or	  increased	  during	  the	  prior	  three	  years	  (see	  Figure	  7).	  Of	  all	  the	  surveys,	  this	  
is	  the	  highest	  percentage	  for	  these	  two	  categories	  (“stay	  the	  same”	  &	  “increase“)	  combined.	  A	  
perception	  of	  corruption	  throughout	  Russia	  was	  at	  its	  highest	  for	  these	  three	  years	  leading	  up	  
to	  the	  2010	  survey.	  This	  information	  also	  touches	  on	  the	  Putin	  years.	  One	  of	  the	  three	  years	  
prior	  to	  2010	  was	  during	  Putin’s	  second	  term.	  Thus,	  the	  effects	  of	  Putin’s	  effort	  or	  the	  lack	  
thereof	  to	  battle	  corruption	  might	  have	  affected	  this	  data	  as	  well.	  	  
	  
The	  survey	  for	  the	  2010-­‐11	  GCB	  was	  conducted	  from	  June	  17	  to	  July	  22	  of	  2010.41	  	  
	  
	   In	  2013,	  as	  Russians	  looked	  back	  on	  two	  years	  instead	  of	  three,	  their	  perception	  of	  
corruption	  was	  essentially	  the	  same	  (Figure	  8).	  In	  2010,	  53%	  of	  Russians	  believed	  that	  
corruption	  had	  increased	  versus	  50%	  in	  2013.	  8%	  believing	  corruption	  had	  decreased	  versus	  
                                                
40	  Global	  Corruption	  Barometer	  2013.	  Appendix	  A:	  Global	  Corruption	  Barometer	  survey	  methodology.	  Transparency	  
International.	  
41	  Information	  and	  data	  for	  this	  chart	  come	  from:	  GCB	  2010-­‐11.	  Appendix:	  A2.	  Transparency	  International;	  Global	  
Corruption	  Barometer	  2013.	  Section	  1:	  Tab	  1a.	  August	  2012.	  Microsoft	  Excel	  File. 
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Figure	  7	  -­‐	  Survey	  results	  from	  the	  quesBon,	  
"In	  the	  past	  three	  years,	  how	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  changed	  in	  this	  country?"	  






11%	  in	  2013,	  a	  very	  modest	  change	  (see	  Figure	  8).	  From	  the	  beginning	  of	  Medvedev’s	  
presidency	  to	  the	  end,	  perceptions	  of	  corruption	  appear	  little	  different.	  	   	  
	  
The	  survey	  for	  the	  2013	  GCB	  was	  conducted	  some	  time	  between	  September	  2012	  and	  March	  2013.42	  
The	  Impact	  of	  Medvedev’s	  Efforts	  on	  Perceptions	  of	  Corruption	  
	   The	  government	  effectiveness	  variable	  tells	  a	  somewhat	  different	  story.	  
Those	  who	  perceived	  corruption	  to	  stay	  the	  same	  and	  increase	  was	  as	  high	  as	  92%	  when	  
respondents	  were	  asked	  about	  past	  corruption	  during	  the	  first	  half	  of	  Medvedev’s	  presidency.43	  
Yet,	  approximately	  one	  quarter	  of	  respondents	  said	  the	  government	  was	  effective	  at	  fighting	  
corruption.	  It	  appears	  that	  Medvedev’s	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  did	  not	  influence	  perceptions	  of	  
general	  corruption.	  Rather,	  his	  efforts	  only	  influenced	  a	  portion	  of	  respondents’	  perceptions	  
about	  government	  effectiveness.	  Why	  is	  this	  so?	  
	   Perhaps	  certain	  respondents	  are	  affected	  by	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  only	  when	  
considering	  government	  effectiveness	  and	  general	  corruption	  in	  the	  present	  and	  the	  future	  and	  
not	  the	  past.	  Or	  perhaps	  for	  some	  respondents	  presidential	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  do	  not	  
influence	  perceptions	  of	  corruption	  but	  do	  influence	  perceptions	  of	  government	  effectiveness.	  
                                                
42	  Information	  and	  data	  for	  this	  chart	  come	  from:	  GCB	  2013.	  Appendix	  A.	  Transparency	  International;	  Global	  
Corruption	  Barometer	  2013.	  GCB2013	  Data.	  July	  2013.	  Microsoft	  Excel	  File. 
43	  GCB	  2013.	  Section	  1:	  Tab	  1a.Microsoft	  Excel	  File.	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Figure	  8	  -­‐	  Survey	  results	  from	  the	  quesBon,	  
"Over	  the	  past	  two	  years,	  how	  has	  the	  level	  of	  corrupBon	  in	  this	  country	  
changed?"	  






	   Under	  Putin,	  respondents	  were	  asked	  how	  corruption	  would	  change	  over	  a	  future	  three	  
year	  period.	  A	  few	  responded	  in	  a	  way	  that	  suggested	  his	  efforts	  influenced	  them	  to	  respond	  
positively,	  meaning	  they	  indicated	  corruption	  would	  improve.	  The	  question	  in	  the	  surveys	  
about	  government	  effectiveness	  asked	  about	  corruption	  in	  the	  present.	  Again,	  a	  number	  of	  
respondents	  appeared	  to	  be	  influenced	  positively	  by	  presidential	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts.	  The	  
questions	  about	  corruption	  changing	  in	  the	  past	  three	  or	  two	  years	  did	  not	  reveal	  a	  correlation	  
between	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  and	  perceptions.	  Perhaps	  the	  small	  number	  of	  respondents	  
influenced	  by	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  did	  not	  notice	  a	  change	  when	  looking	  behind	  them,	  but	  
were	  able	  to	  develop	  positive	  feelings	  and	  expectations	  about	  the	  present	  and	  the	  future.	  
However,	  the	  overall	  correlation	  between	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  and	  expectations	  about	  future	  
changes	  in	  corruption	  levels	  remains	  weak	  and	  may	  not	  be	  significant.	  	   	  
	   The	  second	  possibility	  says	  that	  presidential	  efforts	  influenced	  perceptions	  of	  
government	  effectiveness	  but	  not	  perceptions	  of	  corruption.	  Respondents	  might	  have	  believed	  
anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  by	  the	  president	  and	  the	  government	  was	  sufficient	  but	  society’s	  ability	  
to	  receive	  such	  efforts	  was	  not.	  	  	  
Observations	  from	  the	  President	  of	  Russia	  Website	  
	   From	  the	  President	  of	  Russia	  website,	  I	  found	  more	  articles	  (19)	  about	  the	  anti-­‐
corruption	  efforts	  of	  Medvedev	  over	  a	  two-­‐year	  span	  than	  I	  found	  articles	  (6)	  about	  the	  anti-­‐
corruption	  efforts	  of	  Putin	  over	  a	  six	  year	  span.	  Similarly,	  from	  the	  Moscow	  Times,	  I	  found	  fifty-­‐
seven	  articles	  dealing	  with	  Medvedev’s	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  over	  a	  two	  year	  span	  and	  only	  
thirty-­‐six	  about	  Putin’s	  efforts	  over	  a	  five	  year	  span.	  Even	  so,	  Russians	  remained	  mostly	  






prominent	  efforts	  of	  Medvedev	  to	  remedy	  corruption	  did	  not	  noticeably	  alter	  public	  
perceptions	  of	  corruption.	  	  	  
	   In	  the	  years	  Russians	  were	  asked	  about	  corruption	  in	  general,	  three	  quarters	  and	  above	  
answered	  that	  it	  would	  stay	  the	  same	  or	  increase.	  It	  did	  not	  matter	  whether	  they	  were	  looking	  
backward	  or	  forward.	  In	  fact,	  the	  combined	  percentages	  of	  those	  indicating	  corruption	  stayed	  
the	  same	  or	  increased	  were	  highest	  in	  2010	  (92%)	  44	  and	  in	  2013	  (89%).45	  These	  GCBs	  were	  
influenced	  by	  both	  presidents,	  but	  again,	  Medvedev’s	  more	  salient	  efforts	  did	  nothing	  to	  
improve	  the	  general	  perceptions	  of	  Russians	  towards	  corruption	  and	  only	  slightly	  towards	  
perceptions	  of	  government	  effectiveness.	  
Conclusion	  
	   Originally,	  I	  anticipated	  that	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  made	  by	  Medvedev	  and	  possibly	  
Putin	  would	  induce	  the	  Russian	  public	  to	  see	  corruption	  as	  declining.	  Demidov	  (2005)	  and	  
Holmes	  (2008	  had	  warned	  that	  Putin’s	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  had	  failed,	  so	  my	  expectations	  
about	  the	  influence	  of	  Putin’s	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  on	  public	  perceptions	  were	  low.	  I	  
expected	  Medvedev	  to	  demonstrate	  a	  greater	  impact	  on	  perceptions	  simply	  because	  a	  more	  
expansive	  anti-­‐corruption	  effort	  was	  on	  display	  in	  the	  media.	  However,	  the	  data	  were	  more	  
consistent	  with	  a	  persistent	  public	  appraisal	  of	  the	  futility	  of	  any	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  under	  
any	  president.	  Holmes	  (2008)	  notes	  that,	  in	  the	  public	  mind,	  Russian	  presidents	  have	  failed	  to	  
fulfill	  their	  promises.	  Consistent	  with	  their	  cynicism,	  Russians	  have	  generally	  remained	  
accepting	  of	  corruption	  (Kofanova	  &	  Petukhov	  2006).	  	  
                                                
44	  GCB	  2010-­‐11.	  Section1I:	  Tab	  1a.	  Transparency	  International.	  






	   Man	  (2009)	  believes	  that	  Russian	  regimes	  need	  to	  involve	  society	  more	  in	  the	  fight	  
against	  corruption.	  One	  might	  wish	  that	  Putin	  and	  Medvedev	  had	  found	  a	  source	  capable	  of	  
encouraging	  the	  involvement	  of	  the	  Russian	  people,	  but	  the	  results	  tell	  a	  different	  story.	  
	   Ultimately,	  a	  majority	  of	  Russians	  remain	  skeptical	  towards	  corruption	  regardless	  of	  
anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  from	  Putin	  and	  Medvedev.	  Under	  Putin,	  we	  learned	  that	  one	  of	  his	  anti-­‐
corruption	  campaigns	  actually	  increased	  perceptions	  of	  corruption.	  The	  campaign	  involved	  
firing,	  replacing,	  and	  enacting	  legislation	  to	  fire	  individuals	  for	  reasons	  of	  corruption.	  Man	  
(2009)	  notes	  that	  efforts	  to	  fire	  individuals	  have	  never	  been	  looked	  upon	  positively	  by	  Russians.	  
Similar	  actions	  by	  government	  leaders	  during	  Soviet	  times	  and	  throughout	  Yeltsin’s	  presidency	  
were	  carried	  out	  to	  diminish	  political	  competition.	  Purges	  have	  left	  a	  negative	  impression	  in	  the	  
Russian	  public	  mind	  and	  have	  contributed	  to	  a	  public	  disdain	  for	  government.	  A	  different	  type	  
of	  anti-­‐corruption	  reform	  might	  be	  needed	  to	  influence	  public	  perceptions	  in	  a	  positive	  manner.	  	  	  
Again,	  public	  involvement	  might	  be	  the	  key	  to	  that	  conception.	  
	   Two	  modest,	  but	  positive	  results	  emerged	  from	  the	  data:	  1)	  a	  small	  number	  of	  Russians	  
indicated	  the	  government	  was	  effective	  in	  fighting	  corruption	  and	  this	  correlates	  with	  
presidential	  efforts,	  and	  2)	  there	  is	  a	  possibility	  that	  presidential	  efforts	  influenced	  a	  small	  
number	  of	  Russians	  to	  think	  general	  levels	  of	  corruption	  were	  expected	  to	  decline	  in	  the	  future.	  	  
	   While	  there	  is	  skepticism	  towards	  corruption	  that	  seems	  to	  continue	  from	  Soviet	  times,	  
small	  percentages	  of	  Russians	  appear	  receptive	  to	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  made	  by	  Putin	  and	  
Medvedev.	  Of	  course,	  we	  do	  not	  know	  how	  many	  Russians	  paid	  attention	  to	  anti-­‐corruption	  
efforts	  in	  the	  press.	  If	  more	  Russians	  were	  informed	  about	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  then	  more	  






	   Robert	  Orttung	  (2006)	  explains	  how	  Putin	  tightened	  control	  of	  the	  media	  during	  his	  
presidency	  and	  argues	  this	  was	  one	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  Putin’s	  failure	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  
corruption.	  The	  public	  may	  have	  been	  unaffected	  by	  messages	  in	  the	  press	  about	  anti-­‐
corruption	  efforts	  because	  people	  believed	  the	  press	  was	  untrue	  to	  what	  was	  actually	  
happening.	  Other	  methods	  of	  informing	  the	  populace	  might	  be	  more	  successful.	  	  
	   Even	  so,	  we	  are	  not	  sure	  this	  is	  the	  case.	  We	  do	  not	  know	  if	  Medvedev	  controlled	  the	  
media	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  Putin	  did	  or	  whether	  the	  public	  perceived	  that	  Medvedev	  had	  
loosened	  controls.	  The	  data	  suggest	  that	  Medvedev	  influenced	  perceptions	  to	  a	  greater	  degree	  
than	  did	  Putin	  from	  this	  study.	  Greater	  faith	  in	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  press	  under	  Medvedev	  
might	  have	  given	  press	  reports	  greater	  weight.	  Maybe	  presidents	  who	  exhibit	  greater	  anti-­‐
corruption	  efforts	  while	  maintaining	  openness	  through	  the	  media	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  improve	  
Russian’s	  perceptions	  of	  corruption.	  
	   Our	  understanding	  could	  be	  improved	  with	  research	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  
populace	  pays	  attention	  to	  the	  press,	  and	  whether	  they	  believe	  in	  the	  truthfulness	  of	  press	  
reports.	  For	  now,	  Russians	  remain	  skeptical	  in	  their	  views	  about	  the	  prospects	  for	  reducing	  
corruption,	  and	  it	  will	  likely	  take	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  effort	  from	  government	  and	  society	  to	  change	  










Appendix:	  Chart	  1	  
	  
Each	  article	  mentions	  an	  action	  or	  a	  voiced	  action	  (an	  action	  that	  is	  only	  verbal	  or	  the	  mention	  of	  an	  action	  to	  be	  done	  in	  the	  










































2003	  GCB	  (Survey	  conducted	  in	  July	  '02)	  







2004	  GCB	  (Survey	  conducted	  in	  July	  '04)	  





2005	  GCB	  (Survey	  conducted	  in	  May	  '05)	  








2006	  GCB	  (Survey	  conducted	  in	  July	  '06)	  





2007	  GCB	  (Survey	  conducted	  in	  June	  '07)	  
PuBn	  -­‐	  Moscow	  Times	  (Amount	  of	  ArBcles	  that	  Appear	  when	  Searching	  	  
with	  the	  Keywords	  "PuBn	  CorrupBon"	  During	  the	  	  
Periods	  for	  the	  2003	  to	  2007	  GCBs)	  
Acpon	  Arpcles	  Where	  Pupn	  &	  the	  Anp-­‐Corruppon	  Effort	  Appear	  in	  the	  Headline	  (8	  total)	  
Voiced	  Acpon	  Arpcles	  Where	  Pupn	  &	  the	  Anp-­‐Corruppon	  Effort	  Appear	  in	  the	  Headline	  (3	  total)	  
Acpon	  Arpcles	  (17	  Total)	  








Each	  article	  mentions	  an	  action	  or	  a	  voiced	  action	  (an	  action	  that	  is	  only	  verbal	  or	  the	  mention	  of	  an	  action	  to	  be	  done	  in	  the	  













































Before	  November	  26,	  2008	  
2009	  GCB	  (Survey	  conducted	  in	  Nov.	  '08)	  













Before	  July	  22,	  2010	  
2010	  GCB	  (Survey	  conducted	  in	  June	  &	  July	  '10)	  
Medvedev	  -­‐	  Moscow	  Times	  (Amount	  of	  ArBcles	  that	  Appear	  when	  	  
Searching	  with	  the	  Keywords	  "Medvedev	  CorrupBon"	  	  
During	  the	  Periods	  for	  the	  2009	  &	  2010	  GCBs)	  
Acpon	  Arpcles	  Where	  Medvedev	  &	  the	  Anp-­‐Corruppon	  Effort	  Appear	  in	  the	  Headline	  (6	  total)	  
Voiced	  Acpon	  Arpcles	  Where	  Pupn	  &	  the	  Anp-­‐Corruppon	  Effort	  Appear	  in	  the	  Headline	  (5	  
total)	  
Acpon	  Arpcles	  (35	  Total)	  







































THE	  FOLLOWING	  ARTICLES	  ONLY	  MENTION	  PUTIN	  &	  THE	  ANTI-­‐
CORRUPTION	  EFFORT	  IN	  THE	  BODY	  OF	  THE	  ARTICLE	  
Firing,	  replacing,	  etc.	  an	  individual(s)	  due	  to	  corruppon	  (7	  total)	  
Cuung	  or	  ordering	  to	  cut	  the	  number	  of	  government	  employees	  
to	  prevent	  corruppon	  (2	  total)	  
Anp-­‐corruppon	  legislapon	  or	  undefined	  anp-­‐corruppon	  decree	  
(2	  total)	  
Invespgapon	  ordered,	  performed,	  etc.	  to	  find	  out	  corruppon	  (1	  
total)	  
Pledged	  commitment	  or	  a	  menpon	  of	  the	  importance	  to	  fight	  
corruppon	  (2	  total)	  
Urging	  or	  ordering	  others	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  corruppon	  (2	  total)	  
Reprimanding	  others	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  corruppon	  (3	  total)	  
Raising	  government	  employee's	  income	  to	  avoid	  corruppon	  (6	  
total)	  
High	  level	  anp-­‐corruppon	  conversapon	  (1	  total)	  
THE	  FOLLOWING	  ARTICLES	  MENTION	  PUTIN	  &	  THE	  ANTI-­‐
CORRUPTION	  EFFORT	  IN	  THE	  HEADLINE	  &	  THE	  BODY	  OF	  THE	  
ARTICLE	  
Firing,	  replacing,	  etc.	  an	  individual(s)	  due	  to	  corruppon	  (5	  total)	  
Pledged	  commitment	  or	  a	  menpon	  of	  the	  importance	  to	  fight	  
corruppon	  (2	  total)	  
Urging	  or	  ordering	  others	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  corruppon	  (1	  total)	  
Creapon	  or	  involvement	  of	  a	  commivee,	  council,	  etc.	  to	  fight	  
corruppon	  (2	  total)	  
Delegapng	  anp-­‐corruppon	  efforts	  to	  others	  (1	  total)	  
PuBn	  -­‐	  Moscow	  Times	  (PresidenBal	  AnB-­‐CorrupBon	  Efforts	  Catagorized	  and	  Divided	  
into	  the	  Periods	  for	  the	  2003	  to	  2007	  GCBs)	  	  
2003	  GCB	  Acpon	   2003	  GCB	  Voiced	  Acpon	   2004	  GCB	  Acpon	   2004	  GCB	  Voiced	  Acpon	  
2005	  GCB	  Acpon	   2005	  GCB	  Voiced	  Acpon	   2006	  GCB	  Acpon	   2006	  GCB	  Voiced	  Acpon	  






































THE	  FOLLOWING	  ARTICLES	  ONLY	  MENTION	  MEDVEDEV	  &	  THE	  
ANTI-­‐CORRUPTION	  EFFORT	  IN	  THE	  BODY	  OF	  THE	  ARTICLE	  
Firing,	  replacing,	  etc.	  an	  individual(s)	  due	  to	  corruppon	  (10	  
total)	  
Cuung	  or	  ordering	  to	  cut	  the	  number	  of	  government	  
employees	  to	  prevent	  corruppon	  (2	  total)	  
Requiring	  government	  employees	  to	  declare	  income	  &/or	  
limit	  income	  (6	  total)	  
Ordering	  or	  enacpng	  reform	  to	  dimish	  corruppon	  (7	  total)	  
Anp-­‐corruppon	  legislapon	  or	  undefined	  anp-­‐corruppon	  
decree	  (6	  total)	  
Receiving,	  revealing,	  or	  redefining	  a	  plan(s)	  to	  fight	  corruppon	  
(2	  total)	  	  
Pledged	  commitment	  or	  a	  menpon	  of	  the	  importance	  to	  fight	  
corruppon	  (5	  total)	  
Urging	  or	  ordering	  others	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  corruppon	  (2	  
total)	  
Reprimanding	  others	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  corruppon	  (1	  total)	  
Creapon	  or	  involvement	  of	  a	  commivee,	  council,	  etc.	  to	  fight	  
corruppon	  (2	  total)	  
Delegapng	  anp-­‐corruppon	  efforts	  to	  others	  (1	  total)	  
High	  level	  anp-­‐corruppon	  conversapon	  (1	  total)	  
Raising	  government	  employee's	  income	  to	  avoid	  corruppon	  (1	  
total)	  
Establishing	  a	  reserve	  of	  qualified	  personnel	  for	  the	  president	  
(1	  total)	  
THE	  FOLLOWING	  ARTICLES	  MENTION	  MEDVEDEV	  &	  THE	  ANTI-­‐
CORRUPTION	  EFFORT	  IN	  THE	  HEADLINE	  &	  THE	  BODY	  
Cuung	  or	  ordering	  to	  cut	  the	  number	  of	  government	  
employees	  to	  prevent	  corruppon	  (2	  total)	  
Ordering	  or	  enacpng	  reform	  to	  dimish	  corruppon	  (1	  total)	  
Anp-­‐corruppon	  legislapon	  or	  undefined	  anp-­‐corruppon	  
decree	  (1	  total)	  
Receiving,	  revealing,	  or	  redefining	  a	  plan(s)	  to	  fight	  corruppon	  
(2	  total)	  	  
Invespgapon	  ordered,	  performed,	  etc.	  to	  find	  out	  corruppon	  
(1	  total)	  
Pledged	  commitment	  or	  a	  menpon	  of	  the	  importance	  to	  fight	  
corruppon	  (1	  total)	  
Reprimanding	  others	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  corruppon	  (1	  total)	  
Creapon	  or	  involvement	  of	  a	  commivee,	  council,	  etc.	  to	  fight	  
corruppon	  
Medvedev	  -­‐	  Moscow	  Times	  (PresidenBal	  AnB-­‐CorrupBon	  Efforts	  Catagorized	  and	  
Divided	  into	  the	  Periods	  for	  the	  2009	  &	  2010	  GCBs)	  
2009	  GCB	  Acpon	   2009	  GCB	  Voiced	  Acpon	  	   2010	  GCB	  Acpon	  	   2010	  GCB	  Voiced	  Acpon	  	  
